Tuesday, 22 January 2013

TAIL (Trade and Investment Liberalization) Wags Investment Dog?

A Shrinking Universe by Jordan Brennan on the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives website argues that trade and investment liberalization measures such as the 1988 Canada - US Free Trade Agreement and the NAFTA extension in 1994 have warped economic power such that the 60 biggest corporations have grabbed an ever-increasing share of the wealth and income pie. Here is one of the study's charts.
Apart from the huge downward dagger around 2001 - due to the tech bubble and Nortel bust? - there certainly looks to have been an upward trend in earnings share and market cap share. If Brennan is right as to the cause - the TAIL wagging the investment dog - then maybe investors in TSX 60 companies e.g. by holding iShares S&P/TSX 60 Index Fund (XIU), just need to sit back and enjoy their profitable future so long as trade liberalization doesn't end.

Would that life were so simple. I just wonder why the lower end of the TSX Composite stocks, held for example in the iShares S&P/TSX Completion Index Fund (XMD) seems to have performed just as well as XIU over the past ten years, in fact, a little better - XMD's total annual compound return (net of costs including a higher MER) was 9.58% while XIU's was 9.09%.

Perhaps there are other explanations than TAIL, like the amazing rise to dominance of financial services over the last 25 years?

Brennan's study is interesting as well for a few other bits of data: in 1965 there were 153,000 private and public corporations in Canada and by 2009 there were over 1.3 million. A sizeable proportion, more than executives, of the people in the top 1% of earners are health professionals.

Tuesday, 15 January 2013

Book Review: The Missing Risk Premium by Eric Falkenstein

Not many books can be summed up in one sentence but this one can be and author Falkenstein does it himself in this quote taken from his Falkenblog: "... risk is generally not related to expected return because people are more envious than greedy". This is a radical blockbuster statement with significant implications for both finance theorists and practically minded investors.

The book is a meticulous exposition and expansion of this quote - starting with a description of standard finance theory relating to portfolio management and asset pricing focusing on risk vs return, the "how things are supposed to work" according to the theory, which is basically that there is a expected return premium for taking on risk based on one and only one starting assumption "... that our happiness is solely dependent on our individual wealth and increases at a decreasing rate" i.e. people are greedy. Falkenstein proceeds to document the extensive finance research that shows how the theory simply does not work in the real world - empirically vacuous or bankrupt, as he puts it - and how the attempts to fix it have created a hodge-podge of adjustments devoid of intuitive sense. The basic idea that there should be a higher expected return for taking on more risk he says has been perversely twisted by defenders of the Capital Asset Pricing Model faith - anything that shows a higher actual return, like small cap stocks and value stocks, must be riskier, though no one can actually say how these types of assets are riskier.

In fact (the factual-ness of which he takes many pages to demonstrate - there are lots of footnotes to studies done by many researchers) - Falkenstein finds that the highest risk (in an intuitive sense) end of many asset classes displays markedly lower, not higher, returns. Examples in penny stocks, equity options, IPOs, currencies, corporate bonds, futures, real estate are cited. This is the empirical part of the explanation of why low volatility investing works - it eliminates the significant chronic return drag at the highest risk end of the spectrum.

Falkenstein then moves on to his theory, the "because" part of the quote at the top of this review. He proposes that instead of the standard utility function of absolute ever-increasing happiness with wealth that underpins present finance theory, we should instead use a relative utility function to understand asset pricing. Adopting relative utility means that it is assumed people primarily behave in a greedy fashion, in other words that they are happy or satisfied if they are doing well in reference to others. In investment terms, people use benchmarks to judge success. They want to outperform relative to some standard such as the TSX Composite. Under such an assumption, Falkenstein shows, with the same straightforward math as for the CAPM, that the risk premium is zero. A zero risk investment is no longer something like a no-volatility T-bill but a security that tracks the benchmark. He says this viewpoint explains asset pricing and indeed many other human behaviours (such as why 21st century humans are not happier than people of a century ago despite being a lot richer in absolute terms).

Falkenstein goes on to examine how and why people take too much financial risk and why he thinks his theory has been ignored for so long (his own PhD dissertation was on the subject in 1994 and he traces key ideas to others going back to the 1970s). The final chapter outlines how to benefit in a practical way from his findings and theory. That is the low volatility strategy. The proof is in the pudding he says and he cites studies and his own out-of-sample investing success as evidence.

This book is important to every investor. If he's right, it points to a better investing strategy through minimum variance or low beta portfolios. There are low volatility/ low beta ETFs available to ordinary investors. Falkenstein's theory implies that passive index ETF investing will do poorly (lower returns and higher volatility) in comparison to low volatility ETF investing (assuming, of course, that fees remain within certain limits). Unlike passing anomalies that have disappeared or for which there is no theory to support why outperformance should continue (we note the irony of referring to outperformance as a test of whether it's good or not but that's the way the world works!), this book offers such support. If he's right, the ideas of this book will be viewed as foundational to finance.

Even if you think he's wrong, the book will surely make you think hard. If you think you understand the what and why of finance theory, try to say why's he's wrong.

Much of it is not easy to read, as he slides into and out of highly technical statistical or economic issues. On the other hand, much of it is also highly intuitive and appeals to common sense using plain language.

Falkenstein is very aware of his rebel status in finance. "A crank is simply someone with a minority opinion among his peers, and the key to whether that person is considered a genius or stupid is whether he was correct, which is often known only with hindsight." Those who would dismiss him merely because he thinks the CAPM is fatally broken, in opposition to the mainstream of finance academics, are doing so too blithely. He is extremly conversant with the finance literature (208 footnotes in this brief book and reams of citations in his bibliography) and it sure looks like he understands the stats and math (here, I must express my own limitation in being able to judge this properly). Read his blog and his home page here to judge for yourself whether he knows what he's talking about. These sites contain links to many of his papers where much of the book's ideas are also found. There's even a hilareous video with toy people called Asset Pricing Theory Explained and a 5 minute summary of this book on this page.

Falkenstein writes like a man in a hurry. Though generally very eloquent and quotable, sometimes his sentences are dense and must be re-read to detect implicit commas and awkward phrasing, sometimes words even seem to be missing or he assumes the reader knows technical stuff as well as he does. There's also no index - that would help for the paper version (search works fine in the Kindle on a laptop). These are quibbles.

Is he right? Time will certainly tell - about 2050 is the date he says the data will have gone on long enough for the doubters to conclude with statistical tests that he is right. Meantime, we can check his blog for evidence coming in as he reviews new articles on the topic, such as this post last May. The discussion of some EDHEC findings in that post and many accounts within the book of findings in finance research subsequently being negated when data errors and sampling problems, certainly induce caution in reaching a conclusion.

Nevertheless, the arguments and evidence is credible and convincing enough that, as a matter of disclosure, I will say that I have bought a significant position in a low volatility equity ETF.

Quotes:
  • "The idea that to get rich you need to take risk seems to imply that risk begets higher returns, but this is just a logical fallacy, like using successful gamblers as role models for investing."
  • "Although broad asset indexes contain the wisdom of crowds, they also necessarily contain a lot of foolishness that make them distinctly suboptimal portfolios. ... By ridding your asset classes of these objectively bad assets, you can improve your returns rather simply, and this has been demonstrated in real time via the dominance of low-volatility investing."
  • "...like the latest miracle diet, the latest anomaly is treated skeptically by your average expert for good reason—because most have been dead ends based on selection biases or bad data."
  • "when you measure distress directly, as opposed to merely inferring it from the size and value dimensions, such stocks deliver abnormally low returns, patently inconsistent with value and size effects as compensation for the risk of financial distress."
  • "R-rated movies are the high volatility stocks of the movie industry."
  • "Simon Lack notes that over the 1998-2010 period, a whopping 97% of the dollar profits generated by the hedge fund industry went to the fund managers, not the investors."
  • "Risk takers dominate our lives via their disproportionate effect on our genes and their influence on our technology and culture. They did not become successful, however, merely by taking some abstract risk that is the same for everyone and then enjoy the higher rewards that came with it. They instead took the right risks, those consistent with their unique strengths, and reaped rewards consistent with a mastery of something important."
  • "... children not only lie, but lie more the higher their IQ."
  • "A major problem is that as most of the active and esteemed researchers have built their careers extending or modifying the current framework, it would be very costly to classify work built on bad assumptions as irrelevant, and so there is this strong desire to work within the paradigm and salvage all those mentor’s reputations."

Rating: 5 out of 5 stars, original and important, a must read

Wednesday, 5 December 2012

Readings on the History of the Financial Crisis 2007-2009

Worth reading:  summary of the "how it happened" of the financial crisis 2007-2009 - Getting up to Speed on the Financial Crisis: A One‐Weekend‐Reader’s Guide by Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick

Quotes:
  • "... changes  in  credit  supply  (bank  loans)  are  a  strong  predictor  of  financial  crises, particularly  when  these  changes  are  accelerating... "
  • "Credit booms seem to often coincide with house price increases."
  • "House  price  run‐ups  prior  to  crises  are  common."
  • "... the financial crisis of 2007‐2009 was not special, but follows a pattern of build‐ups of fragility that is typical."
  • "... banks cut back on credit supply, although the demand for credit also
    fell
    " and the availability of credit is how the real economy was harmed - companies reduced expenditures and cut employees
  • "The  financial  crisis  of  2007‐2009  was  perhaps  the  most  important  economic  event  since  the  Great Depression."
  • "The  crisis  was  exacerbated  by  panics  in  the  banking  system,  where various  types  of  short‐term  debt suddenly became subject to runs.  This, also, was a typical part of historical crises.  The novelty here was in the location  of  runs,  which  took  place  mostly  in  the  newly  evolving “shadow  banking”  system, including  money‐market  mutual  funds, commercial  paper,  securitized  bonds,  and  repurchase agreements.  This  new  source  of  systemic  vulnerability  came  as  a  surprise  to policymakers and economists ..."
The report summarizes the mechanisms through which the relatively tiny (in global financial system terms) rising defaults in sub-prime mortgages set off a chain of contagion that almost brought down the global financial system and the dire real economy consequences we are still living with. The good and the faultless get side-swiped along with the bad and the guilty.

This kind of report is a salutary dispassionate counterpoint to ones like The Big Banks' Big Secret from the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, which paints the Canadian government's intervention in providing liquidity, primarily through CMHC buying bank-owned mortgages, as a reprehensible and un-necessary bank bailout. Canada's actions were so minor in a global scale that it does not even figure as one of the 13 key countries in the IMF's Chapter III. Market Interventions during the Financial Crisis: How Effective and How to Disengage? referenced in the Gorton paper. Canada's actions were exactly in line with those of all the other countries, however. Canada, and Canadian banks, didn't cause the crisis but everyone has suffered, and could have suffered a lot more without intervention.

Thursday, 29 November 2012

Hooray! MER Cuts on US Powershares RAFI ETFs

IndexUniverse posted details today of US-based Invesco Powershares cuts on several RAFI fundamental index ETFs. The cuts in MERs are quite significant - almost half. The reductions in MER vary from 0.30% to 0.36% e.g. for PowerShares FTSE RAFI Emerging Markets Portfolio (NYSEArca: PXH), which goes from 0.85% MER to 0.49%. This is excellent news since the difference will go straight to the bottom line and boost investor returns, mine included, as these ETFs are a core part of my holdings.

Tuesday, 27 November 2012

Good-ish News: TFSA Limit Rising to $5500 in 2013

Caught this item on Investment Executive saying the government has raised the TFSA annual contribution limit for 2013 to $5500, up from the $5000 it has been for each year since TFSAs started in 2009 (here's the official press announcement). It's only good-ish news since it isn't an increase in real terms, only compensation for past inflation. As the Department of Finance backgrounder shows, we've been behind inflation through 2012 and now the rounding method will push the limit slightly ahead of inflation for a year, perhaps two. Of course, if you didn't use the $5000 limit from any previous year it has carried over and accumulated but the new annual amount only applies going forward, not also backwards to previous years (see the CRA TFSA info page). Roll on January 1st when the 2013 contribution can be made, I'll be doing it.

Monday, 26 November 2012

Whosh! It's a bird, it's a plane? No, it's Mark Carney coming to save the UK

Let's hope his short-lived Superman imitation as Governor of the Bank of Canada works in the UK, where this blogger happens to spend a lot of time. The commercial bank and Bank of England problems in the UK are far worse, still, than any he had to face in Canada. Certainly the Conservative governments in both countries seem to believe Carney is the greatest thing since sliced monetary stimulus - see the BBC clip of the minister announcing his appointment and the CBC article.

Let's also hope the Canadian government got a few first-round draft picks and other future considerations for the sports superstar of central banking who is, after all, the first ever Bank of Canada Governor not to have served out his term (see Wikipedia links to the others in Carney's Wikipedia profile which, amazingly, someone has already updated with today's news). Raiding requires compensation. They could send Prince William and Kate over perhaps?

One never knows what goes on in the back rooms and boardrooms of government so judging his effectiveness is difficult (his one tangible accomplishment as Governor that I could dig up seems to have been to inject liquidity into the banking system during the financial crisis by buying good short-term bank assets, instead of the less effective US method of buying the toxic assets; other stuff like keeping interest rates low everyone is doing and he was not in the least responsible for the solid position of Canada's banks or of the government's finances that enabled Canada to weather the storm much better than other countries) but for all our sakes, I wish him luck and that he really proves in practise at last that the high regard all seem to have of him is justified.

Shame on W.H. Stuart & Associates - Providing Painful Financial Education

It sure didn't take long for the inadequacies of the current investor protection system to be displayed in cruel fashion after our last post contrasting the arguments of the financial advisor group Advocis with investor gadfly (and I mean that admiringly) Ken Kivenko. Advocis thinks everything is just fine with the system today.

The impartial Ombudsman for Banking Services and Investments investigated the case of the Irons (who have allowed themselves to be identified on this CBC news video), an elderly couple whose financial "advisor" put their money into dubious high-risk investments when their true risk tolerance was clearly low. Inevitably the investments went bad and the couple lost a lot of money they could not afford to lose. The OBSI found the mutual fund company the "advisor" worked for to be negligent and ordered the company to pay compensation. The company W.H. Stuart and Associates has stepped forward, looked the regulator and the victims in the face, and told everyone to shove off, it's not paying.

Meanwhile, on its website it continues to spin its line "W. H. Stuart & Associates is a family owned independent Mutual Fund Dealer & Insurance Agency committed to providing you, the Canadian investor, regardless of your investment amount, with the knowledge to make the right financial investment and retirement decisions to achieve security and peace of mind". Of course, those nit pickers amongst us might note that the sentence does not actually specify whose security and peace of mind the decisions aim to achieve. It could be yours or theirs! 

Elsewhere the Stuart website says "We wanted to build a company where the education of clients about financial matters came first and foremost". In a cruelly ironic way, the Irons have received quite an education. In this month where financial literacy is being promoted as the solution for Canadians maybe there's a lesson from the Irons' experience. Should we be expecting people to acquire engineering literacy to know if the new car they are buying is safe to drive, or medical literacy to decide whether their doctor is giving good treatment advice? (Though it is a bit of a stretch to say that the Irons should not have had the common sense to question why their "guaranteed like a GIC" ill-fated investment would pay them 20% at a time when interest rates were only around 5%) Till fiduciary duty comes into play, the only financial literacy that matters is the ability to figure out who you can trust and who knows what they're doing.

I guess the industry knows that unfortunately, as watchdogs go, the OBSI can only bark and recommend compensation but not bite and order it.

Meanwhile, there is silence from the Mutual Fund Dealers Association of Canada, which Stuart identifies as its strategic partner and which bills itself as having "... a mandate to enhance investor protection and strengthen public confidence in the Canadian mutual fund industry".

In this case, there is also silence from Advocis but we cannot blame them since it seems none of the people nor the firm itself are members of Advocis.

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