Monday, 12 November 2012

Debating Fiduciary Duty - Kivenko vs Pollock of Advocis

Ken Kivenko debates Greg Pollock (CEO of Advocis, an association representing financial advisors) in this BNN video.The intriguing verbal tussle follows on the consultation launched by the Canadian Securities Administrators on the possibility of imposing fiduciary duty as the standard of care for all financial advisors and dealers (see CSA paper here). The video is well worth watching as a gentle introduction to the subject. I think Ken comes off as an effective advocate i.e. wins this debate hands down not only because what he says is true but he expresses it well too. He has also just been named to the Ontario Securities Commission Investor Advisory Panel so maybe can help further such progressive ideas there.

The exacting and somewhat cynically inclined lot over on the Financial Webring are also debating the merits and possible practical consequences of fiduciary duty. One post by Dan Hallett, who runs what looks to me like a financial advisory firm that has already decided to operate with a fiduciary philosophy, posts a comment that includes this great line: "Either it's [i.e. the financial industry] got to give up the sorts of titles and marketing that imply fiduciary advice or embrace the standard with all of the benefits and obligations that involves."

That's the point. It's too complicated. People think they are getting unbiased advice but it rarely is. The financial consequences of biased advice - 20 or more years of a much poorer retirement - are too severe.

... oh, and another bit of info

The Chartered Financial Analyst Institute does an annual survey of its charterholders about ethics in various countries. People with the CFA designation almost all work in the business, so this is an insider's view. But look anyway below in the latest available 2010 Canadian survey report at where the relative and absolute opinion lies regarding the ethical behaviour rating of financial advisers to private individuals - barely above half way and lower than anyone than hedge fund managers and sell side analysts. There also some damning quotes e.g. "In my career the thing that stands out the most is that most advisers are not out for the client’s best interest; instead they are out for their own interests ahead of the client." a Portfolio Manager/Investment Consultant in Canada.

 
Sadly, little seems to have changed compared to the situation when I posted about the same survey in 2008.

Tuesday, 30 October 2012

(In)efficient markets, indices and investors - Martellini explains - brilliant!

Highly recommended: Lionel Martellini's Inefficient Benchmarks in Efficient Markets at the EDHEC Research Institute. Martellini is precise and brief in his explanation of a couple of the slipperiest and most important ideas in finance and investing. Quotes: 
  • " ... cap-weighted indices are inefficient benchmarks, regardless of whether or not markets are efficient (keeping in mind that they probably are efficient, at least to a first-order approximation)... " i.e. the implication is that indices like the S&P 500 and the S&P/TSX 60 aren't very good
  • " ... When the word “efficient” is used in reference to a market, as in the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) formulated by Eugene Fama in 1970, it suggests that at any given time, prices in the market fully reflect all available information on all stocks in the market. ... " and "... there is a consensus regarding the fact that markets can still be regarded as somewhat efficient ... " i.e. it's not impossible but it's hard to outperform the market, considering fees and costs
  • " ... even if markets are efficient, at least up to a first order approximation, investors can still be holding highly inefficient portfolios. The word “efficient”, now applied to a portfolio as opposed to a market, means that the portfolio performance can be improved without any increase in risk through an improvement in the portfolio diversification ..." i.e. it isn't a great idea to invest only in Royal Bank shares even if the price is correct
  • " ... empirical evidence also suggests that the average investor holds a severely inefficient portfolio. In other words, the finding here is that the portfolio held by the average investor, which by definition is a cap-weighted index, tends to be poorly diversified. This result is hardly a new finding, ..." i.e. buying SPY (S&P 500 tracker ETF) or even VTI (Vanguard Total US Market ETF) or XIC (S&P/TSX Total Market ETF) is NOT the ideal thing to do.
  • "... various alternative weighting schemes have been proposed to improve upon cap-weighting (see Amenc et al. (2011), Arnott, Hsu and Moore (2005), Choueifaty and Coignard (2008), Maillard, Roncalli and Teiletche (2008) to name but a few), and it is now commonly accepted that moving away from cap-weighting tends to enhance diversification and increase risk-adjusted performance over long horizons. ..." i.e. consider dumping SPY and XIC. I think the best practical answer is an empirical matter - if another non-cap-weighted (like equal-weighted, or fundamental weighted) index ETF exists for the asset class with reasonable costs that do not eat up the performance gain (e.g. perhaps PRF, EWI, RSP, PXC, CRQ;

Sunday, 28 October 2012

Socially Responsible Funds: Who's Got it Right - RBC or iShares?

Here's an interesting situation. Compare the standard iShares Socially Responsible Canadian equity fund XEN with RBC Asset Management's version RBC302. XEN is passive and has an MER 0.55% while RBC302 adds a layer of active stock picking after applying the same Jantzi social screen as XEN and it sports a much higher MER of 2.1% (on series A, non-advisor class).

RBC302's annualized 5-year return of -0.12% (per Morningstar), including the all-important adjustment for fees, beats XEN's -1.12% (per the Globe Watchlist) by a whopping 1% per year!! and the benchmark cap-weight market fund iShares XIU's -0.83% (also from Globe WatchList) by 0.71%! Of course, the data might not be strictly comparable coming as it does from different sources - why the heck can't the data providers give us ETFs and mutual funds together since most investors want to compare the two?! That's right, an actively managed high-MER mutual fund has beaten the index by a good margin, even after fees.

What explains the difference?
1) RBC has been good at excluding a number of stocks that have been losers. RBC's final investment decision-making step, after the initial screening for the Jantzi social criteria, is to pick stocks with "... above-average financial fundamentals while considering broader factors, such as economic trends, interest rates and the outlook for profits, valuations and stock prices". We only have the top 25 stocks to look at, since RBC doesn't reveal the whole portfolio, but the holdings differences between RBC302 and XEN are significant. 8 stocks are different. The spreadsheet shows in red, which stocks do not appear in the top 25 of the other. Of the 8 in XEN, but not in RBC302, six have significantly negative annualized 5-year total returns.
2) RBC seems to be fairly good at picking winners. As for the stocks in RBC302 that have replaced those losers, 5 out of 8 are 5-year positive and the positives are stronger than the negative. It's interesting that RBC302 is much less concentrated than XEN. It's top 25 only add up to 56.8% of assets vs 82.2% for XEN. RBC is no closet indexer with this fund!


Is "socially responsible" inclusion partly in the eye of the beholder?
Not a single one of the red stocks in the top 25 holdings of RBC302 appears anywhere in XEN, not in the top 25 of XEN, nor within the 61 total holdings of the XEN. Yet all of these stocks are large enough to appear in cap-weight benchmark XIU. What is going on? XEN is strictly a Jantzi index tracker so those stocks must have been screened out as unacceptable according to socially responsible criteria. How the heck does RBC get to put them back in? Unfortunately, the Jantzi index composition and its exact methodology are not disclosed so we cannot go back to the true source to figure this out. It would be ironic if RBC has been beating the virtuous socially responsible index by cheating!

Thanks to Ken Kivenko for the pointer to the RBC Jantzi funds.

Wednesday, 24 October 2012

Sustainable Investing: Is It OK to Destroy the Economy if You Reduce Greenhouse Gas?

It sure is confusing to do the right thing. My most recent foray into looking at what is often called Socially Responsible Investing (SRI), or investing based on Environmental Social and Governance (ESG) factors, started with a recent news item in the Financial Post.  

Group of 49 ethical funds call for greener oilsands made the interesting statement that "... the current approach to development, particularly the management of the environmental and social impacts, threatens the long-term viability of the oilsands as an investment". That's interesting, I said to myself, at last an analysis that takes the viewpoint of the investor who wants to do right but also to understand the long term investment issues. Alas, the future investment risk analysis consists only of a couple of sentences about aboriginal lawsuits and market access restrictions due to potential low-carbon fuel standards laws in the USA. When I tracked down the original stuff from Ceres (why don't mainstream news sites provide a link directly to original sources anyways?), the entire content of the press release and document issued by lobby group Ceres is occupied with micro-management - telling the industry what it should do and what its goals should be. Such blatant lobbying with only the slightest veneer of investment content does more to discredit their effort than gain investor support.

The trickster feel to the Ceres release was exacerbated by the reference to investors with "$2 trillion under management" and "investments in Alberta's oilsands", which disingenuously fails to say exactly what stake those 49 funds have. Presumably if the oil sands producers are doing a bad ESG job, the ethical funds won't be invested, will they?

And if the companies are doing a good job, why do they need Ceres to tell them how to operate at such a micro level? Isn't it curious that the Jantzi Social Index Fund from iShares (TSX symbol: XEN) which buys into "... companies that reflect a higher standard of environmental and social performance", includes among its holdings several notable oil sands companies like Suncor, Imperial Oil and Nexen. Another holier-than-legally-required list, the Newsweek 2012 Green Companies Global Rankings, has Suncor in its list too, as well as another oil sands major Shell (see Wikipedia's oil sands article for others).

The disappointment over the oil sands article turned to real cognitive dissonance distress (hey, I paid for my university education so I get to use those lovely buzzwords) when I looked more closely at the Newsweek list. How the heck do all those major world banks get on the list - RBS, Lloyds, Barclays, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs - those fine upstanding institutions whose follies almost tore apart the world's financial system in 2008 and whose miserable economic consequences continue to this day? Is it ok if banks destroy the economy as long as they recycle, have a small carbon footprint, hire lots of women and minorities and get involved in their local communities?

It's not that it is necessarily misguided to expect more than obeying the law as the desirable mode of operation from companies. Indeed, a few years ago in the Financial Times, Rob Arnott wrote an eloquent piece called Why poor moral ethics prove costly on the necessity for moral ethics (doing what is right) instead of just legal ethics (doing what is allowed).

My objective as an investor is to consider companies holistically. No company is perfect in every way and some things matter more than others. The range of ESG issues shown in the chart image below from index provider MSCI must be considered as a whole. ESG is not enough either. I cannot afford to invest in dud companies that lose money and go out of business no matter what their ESG score may be. A financial and business rating needs to be integrated with the ESG.

What I'd want is some combination of the ESG ratings that determine the holdings of ETFs like XEN in Canada or KLD, DSI, NASI and EAPS in the USA (see these ETFs' details on the ETFdb screen for SRI funds) plus an active index methodology like the RAFI Fundamental ETFs CRQ or PXC in Canada or PRF, PXF, PDN and the like in the USA. They could be called "Fundamental Virtue" ETFs.

Tuesday, 2 October 2012

Kivenko Tells How to Check Out Fund Advisors

Want to avoid an Earl Jones nightmare in your life? Do you know whether the person who wants to sell you mutual funds is on the up-and-up? Ken Kivenko of CanadianFundWatch.com gives us the details on how exactly to check out mutual fund salespeople (technically, dealing representatives, self-termed as advisors) in Checking Registration and Disciplinary History. Unfortunately, the dogs-breakfast regulatory system in Canada means that it takes three pages of single-spaced explanation on how to do this and even then it is not foolproof, but hopefully readers will believe it is worth the effort.

There is another solution of course - be a DIY investor. Then you can wrestle with the question of whether you should entrust yourself to invest your own money.

Wednesday, 26 September 2012

Picking Out Actively Managed Funds that Predictably Outperform

There is an oft-repeated rule of thumb that past performance is no guide to future performance, that picking funds with recent above-average results usually leads to disappointment because their future performance tends to under-perform and revert to the mean. It certainly seems to be true in Canada (e.g. Richard Deaves in the book What Kind of Investor Are You? says there is no historical evidence of persistence in either under- or out-performance). Is that situation necessarily inevitable and immutable?

Along comes Super Fund Performance, a report from the Australian superannuation industry, to say "yes, it is possible to identify with considerable confidence which funds will continue to out- or under-perform". The key differentiator: whether the funds are retail for-profit offerings or not-for-profit (sponsored by public sector, corporate or industry). Not-for-profit has been winning, and by a huge amount - an average of 2% per year for the past 15 years!

Below is a fascinating chart from the study. Especially interesting is that the not-for-profits always did better than the retail for-profit funds. It looks like a sure-fire way for Australians to narrow down retirement fund selection. Too bad the not-for-profit option doesn't exist in Canada and it doesn't look like pension reform via the government's PRPP proposal will change that soon.....

Why the out-performance?
  • lower fees/costs - the report doesn't state the difference but a quick search in one comparison website, the Canstar Superannuation Star Ratings, shows MER ranges from about 0.4% at the very low end to 2.5% at the extreme high end. The big not-for-profit funds look to be in the 0.6-0.8% Total Expense Ratio range according to another comparison site, Selecting Super.
  • economies of scale, but only among the not-for-profit funds; retail funds don't get any more efficient with size, which the report says is due to governance factors - "... either economies of scale are not available to retail funds, or the benefits are not passed on to members". 
  • embedded advice - the for-profit riposte is that their members get financial planning advice much more than clients of the not-for-profits, about twice as often according to Canstar. Investor Daily reporter Wouter Klijin says the not-for-profits are increasingly gearing up to provide advice, which he says will increase their costs and possibly/probably lessen their out-performance down the road. A big question is, of course, how useful the advice is, whether it is merely sales or client-interest-first, depending on the source. From which type of outfit would I want "advice"? That's a pretty easy call I'd say. 
Why Does Mutual Fund Performance not Persist? by Wolfgang Bessler, David Blake, Peter Lückoff and Ian Tonks provides another take on persistence using US data -
  • Winner funds keep winning if, a) the fund investment manager stays on and b) there is NOT high fund inflow
  • Losers start doing a lot better if, a) the investment fund manager is sacked and, b) there is a high fund outflow
The problem for the investor is of course, that what works on average may not happen for the specific fund selected. 

Wednesday, 12 September 2012

Equity Risk Premium and Likely Future Returns: Elroy Dimson's History Lesson

Highly recommended: Rethinking the Equity Risk Premium, Elroy Dimson's free (registration required) audio and slide presentation that says investors should expect no more than 3-3.5% annual real returns from equities over the riskless rate aka government bonds, which currently is more or less 0!

Noted academic and equity researcher Elroy Dimson (best-known as co-author along with Mike Staunton and Paul Marsh of the yearly investor treat called the Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook, 2012 edition here) has been at it again, producing well-explained, substantial commentary on a supremely relevant topic - how much return have investors achieved around the world and what should one expect from equities in future?

Other notable points in the presentation:
  • the equity risk premium has not been constant over time, or from country to country, though equities have substantially outperformed bonds over the past 112 years in every single one of the 19 countries for which they have data (slide 19)
  • over the very long run (100 years or so) currency shifts between countries have barely mattered to equity returns for an international investor (using the USA investor as the example) ... though it has mattered a lot over short periods (slide 17 c. 21 minutes along)
  • most (or all, in some countries) of long-term real equity return comes from reinvested dividends (slides 20 and 222)
There's more fascinating and potentially useful stuff on such topics as - do higher or lower GDP growth countries give better equity returns, do weak or strong currency countries give better equity returns, do high or low dividend markets foretell better equity returns? Here's one of Dimson's slides that reinforces the idea that "valuation matters", at least in the form of dividend yield (as this post on my other blog showed, the current Canadian yield around 3% is around the the historical average):


There's also a background paper with the same title (likely to be heavy reading; though I haven't yet read it, I'd bet it's worthwhile), also free from the CFA Institute.


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