5BX is the exercise program developed by the Royal Canadian Air Force in the 1950s. I've done it (mostly) on and off for all my life since my teens up to now in my 50s. I can no longer do my all-time highest chart level 5 step B+ (I would really like to know if anyone ever managed the bottom level of chart 6, let alone A+). It's not even close. I'm now down to the top of chart 2, which in relative terms is still pretty darn good since it is the prescribed fitness level for someone ten years younger than I am. My 5BX life history is very useful as definitive benchmark of my physical capacity and tells me in no uncertain terms that I ain't quite what I used to be.
Alas, our brains are similar to the rest of our bodies. Regular exercise (thinking, arguing, reading, working on puzzles, writing) surely helps it stay in optimal shape but decline there is nevertheless. It affects our judgment about finances too. In How Older People Behave, chapter 8 in The Future of Life Cycle Saving and Investing: the Retirement Phase from the CFA Institute, David Laibson describes the decline of cognitive function as we age and the result he found in one study - that the older people were, the higher interest rate they paid on home equity loans. This is not dementia or Alzheimers at work, he says. It is the slow natural brain decline from age.
Dementia adds to the scale of the financial challenge and it will get much worse - in Canada, the Alzheimer Society has just published the scary Rising Tide of Dementia, which predicts the prevalence of dementia will more than double over the next 30 years if nothing is done.
The problem with brain decline is that, unlike our physical capacity, it is more hidden and harder for a person to be self-aware. How can you step back in time to assess your old brain of 20 years ago compared to today? In today's retirement world of increasing variety and complexity of financial products, combined with a shift away from defined benefit pensions to plans and savings where people have to make their own decisions and when they are living much longer to boot, retirees look more exposed to high fees on opaque products or pushy fast-talking salespeople, not to mention scams and frauds. The inter-generational transfer of wealth will occur in a manner somewhat different than the inheritance route.
What can be done to minimize the possible harm? Laibson suggests helping people make the right choices by setting defaults and automating investments. He also suggest creating inexpensive and scalable trust structures so that when retirees pass over control of their finances as they are on average progressively forced to do by age, it will be to someone trustworthy.
Monday, 18 January 2010
Friday, 15 January 2010
Claymore PACC DRIP SWP - Beware of the Broker
One of the valuable features of Claymore Canada's ETFs is that the company offers investors three automatic programs, all on a voluntary basis without commissions or fees:
Thanks to Larry MacDonald at Canadian Business for asking the question that prompted me to look into this. You learn something every day.
- PACC - Pre-Authorized Chequing Contributions - owners of ETFs can make regular monthly, quarterly or annual purchases of additional units
- DRIP - Dividend Re-Investment Plan - ETF distributions received are used to buy more units
- SWP - Systematic Withdrawal Plan - ETF units held may be sold on a regular monthly, quarterly or annual schedule
Thanks to Larry MacDonald at Canadian Business for asking the question that prompted me to look into this. You learn something every day.
Labels:
Claymore,
discount brokers,
DRIP,
PACC,
SWP
Haiti Earthquake Relief Charities
Haitians need help in the most dire way. Along with governments, private charities are springing into action. The quickest and easiest way for the average person to help is to give money to those charities. Many charities are accepting donations that will be specifically directed to Haiti.
CanadianCapitalist has posted one list today with links to a few charities. He also references this bigger list on the CBC website, which unusually for the CBC, actually includes direct links to the charities' websites to make donations. The CanadaHelps.org charity portal conveniently provides an extensive list of charities that are accepting Haiti-specific donations and a capability to make a donation on-line to any one of them (it does deduct a 3% fee from donations through its portal - which I think is reasonable as I discussed here).
Charities will differ, often substantially, in their effectiveness and efficiency in transforming our dollars to into help for victims. Some charities will help Haitians a lot more than others even when their mission sounds great. The best available source for hard information to assess this factor I've found so far is the Canada Revenue Agency Giving to Charity page which includes mandatory accounting returns from every registered charity in Canada. Find the Charity Information Return (the T3010) using the Search for a Charity tool.
CanadianCapitalist has posted one list today with links to a few charities. He also references this bigger list on the CBC website, which unusually for the CBC, actually includes direct links to the charities' websites to make donations. The CanadaHelps.org charity portal conveniently provides an extensive list of charities that are accepting Haiti-specific donations and a capability to make a donation on-line to any one of them (it does deduct a 3% fee from donations through its portal - which I think is reasonable as I discussed here).
Charities will differ, often substantially, in their effectiveness and efficiency in transforming our dollars to into help for victims. Some charities will help Haitians a lot more than others even when their mission sounds great. The best available source for hard information to assess this factor I've found so far is the Canada Revenue Agency Giving to Charity page which includes mandatory accounting returns from every registered charity in Canada. Find the Charity Information Return (the T3010) using the Search for a Charity tool.
Labels:
Charity
Thursday, 14 January 2010
The Marshmallow Test, Commitment and Life Success
One of the keys to financial success is controlling desires for immediate gratification by saving instead of spending every penny that comes into our grasp. Such tendencies become visible early in life, it seems.
Long ago a researcher named Walter Mischel tested how well 4 year olds could resist the temptation of one marshmallow now instead of the reward of getting two scant minutes later. The hilarious Kids and the Marshmallow YouTube video re-enactment of the experiment shows how tough it is for kids to resist the urge to gobble up the marshmallow right away.
Some kids are naturally better at it than others. Mischel's and other studies reviewed (see pp 19-21) in the paper Commitment Contracts by Gharad Bryan, Dean Karlan and Scott Nelson of Yale University found that children who are better at deferring gratification are more successful later in life, being more able to concentrate, live with frustration, get higher SAT scores, use drugs less and be perceived to be more competent by parents and peers.
Having a tendency does not necessarily mean an inevitable fate. Humans are wonderfully adaptable and control measures can be put in place to counter such harmful tendencies. This quote from Commitment Contracts is encouraging: "Children were able to wait longer when their attention was shifted, when they could not see the reward, when they were in a cold state (when children were told to think about the abstract qualities of the marshmallow), rather than a hot state (when children were told to think of the taste) and when they were told to be task oriented rather than reward oriented. (Thinking about their aim, rather than what the rewards would be like)"
One direction for correcting and controlling the "I want it now" behaviour that harms not just children but adults too (think of the gap in savings for retirement) is, according to these authors, to put in place Commitments. Commitments can be either hard, with actual costs, or soft, with psychological costs. A hard example: you promise to lose 10kg by July 1st, and you pay someone if you don't achieve that. Soft commitment example: not having junk food in the house.
Dean Karlan believes enough in the principle of making a commitment as an effective way to modify behaviour to have co-founded a special website called StickK where anyone can make a formal Commitment. It seems to be for real. When you sign up, you are contracting to pay and they promise to enforce payment if you do not meet whatever goal it is you yourself define. One of the other co-founders, Ian Ayres, recounts in his book SuperCrunchers how his own successful hard commitment experiment to lose and keep off weight made him a believer too.
Long ago a researcher named Walter Mischel tested how well 4 year olds could resist the temptation of one marshmallow now instead of the reward of getting two scant minutes later. The hilarious Kids and the Marshmallow YouTube video re-enactment of the experiment shows how tough it is for kids to resist the urge to gobble up the marshmallow right away.
Some kids are naturally better at it than others. Mischel's and other studies reviewed (see pp 19-21) in the paper Commitment Contracts by Gharad Bryan, Dean Karlan and Scott Nelson of Yale University found that children who are better at deferring gratification are more successful later in life, being more able to concentrate, live with frustration, get higher SAT scores, use drugs less and be perceived to be more competent by parents and peers.
Having a tendency does not necessarily mean an inevitable fate. Humans are wonderfully adaptable and control measures can be put in place to counter such harmful tendencies. This quote from Commitment Contracts is encouraging: "Children were able to wait longer when their attention was shifted, when they could not see the reward, when they were in a cold state (when children were told to think about the abstract qualities of the marshmallow), rather than a hot state (when children were told to think of the taste) and when they were told to be task oriented rather than reward oriented. (Thinking about their aim, rather than what the rewards would be like)"
One direction for correcting and controlling the "I want it now" behaviour that harms not just children but adults too (think of the gap in savings for retirement) is, according to these authors, to put in place Commitments. Commitments can be either hard, with actual costs, or soft, with psychological costs. A hard example: you promise to lose 10kg by July 1st, and you pay someone if you don't achieve that. Soft commitment example: not having junk food in the house.
Dean Karlan believes enough in the principle of making a commitment as an effective way to modify behaviour to have co-founded a special website called StickK where anyone can make a formal Commitment. It seems to be for real. When you sign up, you are contracting to pay and they promise to enforce payment if you do not meet whatever goal it is you yourself define. One of the other co-founders, Ian Ayres, recounts in his book SuperCrunchers how his own successful hard commitment experiment to lose and keep off weight made him a believer too.
Labels:
behavioural finance,
children
Wednesday, 13 January 2010
Investment Fraud - Phew, that was close! Time for Operant Conditioning?
I'm not sure whether to laugh or cry at the CBC news item today about the arrest of two men for an alleged investment fraud. The key part of the item: "The investments were held out to be for the development of an automated trading system that promised unusually high rates of return," the OPP said in a release. It added the investigation "revealed that the funds solicited were not used in the manner promised, thereby defrauding the investors of their money." I see, so it is only because they did not use the money for an automated trading system that it is illegal? Had they invented an automated trading system of whatever useless nature and lost all the investors' money, that would have been ok. Whew! That was a close one, otherwise they could have got away with it.
To prevent this from, in the classic phrase of our time, "ever happening again", we could consider using Skinner conditioning techniques in schools so that as soon as the words "high rates of return" are mentioned in any investment sales presentation, people immediately get violently ill and verbally abuse whoever utters the phrase. If it works for pigeons and dogs, surely it could do for humans.....
To prevent this from, in the classic phrase of our time, "ever happening again", we could consider using Skinner conditioning techniques in schools so that as soon as the words "high rates of return" are mentioned in any investment sales presentation, people immediately get violently ill and verbally abuse whoever utters the phrase. If it works for pigeons and dogs, surely it could do for humans.....
Labels:
scams
Monday, 11 January 2010
Example of Kaupthing: Market Efficiency at Work
One of the reasons I enjoyed Johnsson's book Why Iceland? so much is the insider view into what drove the failure of Icelandic banks in 2008. The machinations of savvy players show us how market efficiency works, how the search for excess profits or so-called alpha, and the attainment thereof, is actually the source of market efficiency.
Jonsson's story on page 63: The weak position of the Kaupthing bank relative to other banks was noticed first in 2005 by a trader named Herleif Havik at the Petroleum Fund of Norway. He began doing what he perceived to be a kind of low- or no-risk pair of trades, by selling Credit Default Swap (CDS) protection on Barclays bank while buying the same protection on Kaupthing. The reason was apparently that Barclays and Kauthing debt traded at the same premium. Havik figured that Iceland could not, in the event of a crisis, offer the same back-up to Kauthing as Britain could to Barclays. To do the buying and selling of CDS, it was not necessary to actually hold any of the debt and in fact, Jonsson says the PFN did not own any Kaupthing bonds. Havik's trades attracted attention and drove up CDS premiums on Kaupthing. Other financial players began to focus on Iceland. The weakness of the business model of the Icelandic banks had been noticed.
It was by detecting the mis-priced bonds of Kaupthing (aka market inefficiency) and exploiting it that the market forced an eventual and brutal return towards efficiency.
The incident leaves questions to ponder:
Jonsson's story on page 63: The weak position of the Kaupthing bank relative to other banks was noticed first in 2005 by a trader named Herleif Havik at the Petroleum Fund of Norway. He began doing what he perceived to be a kind of low- or no-risk pair of trades, by selling Credit Default Swap (CDS) protection on Barclays bank while buying the same protection on Kaupthing. The reason was apparently that Barclays and Kauthing debt traded at the same premium. Havik figured that Iceland could not, in the event of a crisis, offer the same back-up to Kauthing as Britain could to Barclays. To do the buying and selling of CDS, it was not necessary to actually hold any of the debt and in fact, Jonsson says the PFN did not own any Kaupthing bonds. Havik's trades attracted attention and drove up CDS premiums on Kaupthing. Other financial players began to focus on Iceland. The weakness of the business model of the Icelandic banks had been noticed.
It was by detecting the mis-priced bonds of Kaupthing (aka market inefficiency) and exploiting it that the market forced an eventual and brutal return towards efficiency.
The incident leaves questions to ponder:
- Was PFN, a state-controlled fund no less, and Havik somehow morally to blame for doing so, since the dénoument has left Icelanders suffering?
- Is naked CDS trading bad or merely the equivalent of buying a put or a call? e.g. Bad - SEC chairman Maison Fleury; OK - Derivatives Dribble)
- Was the pendulum swing the other way, all the way to bankruptcy of all the Icelandic banks, the only way back to efficiency, or was it too far?
Labels:
CDS,
efficient-market
Tuesday, 5 January 2010
Book Review: Why Iceland? by Asgeir Jonsson
Imagine every man, woman and child of Victoria, BC being faced with a sudden new debt of $18,000 to repay bank depositors in a foreign country. In addition, this is all through no fault of their own - the people now on the hook had nothing to do with creating the situation. That's what is facing the citizens of Iceland (whose population is about the same as Victoria's) these days as a result of the financial crash of 2008.
Why Iceland?, written by Icelander Asgeir Jonsson, examines how all this happened, how the rise and collapse of Iceland's banks in 2008 bankrupted the country. The title suggests the plaintive cry of an innocent and naive victim asking how such a calamity could come about. One might expect bitterness and incendiary language in the book. Not so however, as the author is also an economist. The approach seems more like morbid professional curiosity in trying to unravel what went wrong. He does so with little overt emotion and much fascinating detail.
Along the way, as they affect Iceland, one learns through Jonsson's succinct and clear explanations about currency swaps, Credit Default Swaps, Collateralized Debt Obligations, the carry trade, hedge funds, glacier bonds, repo funding, central banks, government interventions (or lack thereof) and consequences, credit ratings and agencies. The book is an intricate case study.
The detail is really the object lesson. Iceland did not go down because of one single error, one big villain or one event. It was a combination of many factors both local and global, mistakes at crucial moments that failed to prevent dire consequences of what had been building for some years. (There was even a small Canadian hand in the form of TD Bank whose London office merrily sold to the carry trade wagonloads of highly profitable glacier bonds denominated in Icelandic currency but sold outside Iceland.) A good summary might be the quote he includes from a 2008 Merrill Lynch credit report on Iceland: " ... rapid expansion, inexperienced, yet aggressive management, high dependency on external funding, high gearing to equity markets, connected party opacity. In other words: too fast, too young, too much, too short, too connected, too volatile."
With a little more of the human drama, this book could be made into a Hollywood movie (except of course for the heroic ending). The scene of the hedge fund managers coming to Iceland and mocking the executive of the Icelandic Central Bank as they detected weakness in Iceland's position is ready-made. Jonsson does include bits and pieces of personalities and their effects, though I would have welcomed more since I suspect such elements did influence the course of events more than is apparent in the book.
For Canadians the value of this book is the lessons and warnings. In the final chapter, Jonsson notes that the cost of bank bailout packages may yet become sovereign debt crises. He says some countries are especially at risk: a) small countries with, b) large, internationally exposed banking sectors, c) currency that is not a global reserve currency, and d) limited fiscal capacity. Jonsson asks whether even Britain itself could be in danger according to these criteria. Canada's banks escaped most of the 2008 financial havoc by their heavy reliance on stable domestic deposits so that is reassuring, as is the government's generally strong fiscal capacity, though it has been diminished by stimulus spending. However, Canadian complacency would be serious mistake.
The author does an excellent job keeping the story flowing and the tone light for what could easily have become too technical and dry. The author's position as chief economist at Kaupthing, one of the failed banks, seems not to have interfered with the presentation of a fair and unbiased account (bank executives get their share of blame).
For the individual investor and citizen, perhaps the biggest lesson from this book, is that the economic and investment landscape is highly complex, making it hard to know where things are going. Drastic bad things can and do happen, even to the surprise of highly motivated, smart, not-evil, though self-interested people. If you don't prepare for the worst, it may happen, even if it isn't your doing, and you may suffer the consequences.
Now many people are leaving Iceland, though Jonsson says Icelanders refuse to see themselves as victims. The acceptance of the 12,000 euro per person debt to reimburse Icesave depositors in the UK and Holland is being resisted within Iceland. The story isn't finished and the echoes of the crash will continue for a while yet.
A combination of an education and a good story, I highly recommend this book. My rating: 5 out of 5 stars.
Thank you to McGraw Hill for supplying a copy of the book for review..
Why Iceland?, written by Icelander Asgeir Jonsson, examines how all this happened, how the rise and collapse of Iceland's banks in 2008 bankrupted the country. The title suggests the plaintive cry of an innocent and naive victim asking how such a calamity could come about. One might expect bitterness and incendiary language in the book. Not so however, as the author is also an economist. The approach seems more like morbid professional curiosity in trying to unravel what went wrong. He does so with little overt emotion and much fascinating detail.
Along the way, as they affect Iceland, one learns through Jonsson's succinct and clear explanations about currency swaps, Credit Default Swaps, Collateralized Debt Obligations, the carry trade, hedge funds, glacier bonds, repo funding, central banks, government interventions (or lack thereof) and consequences, credit ratings and agencies. The book is an intricate case study.
The detail is really the object lesson. Iceland did not go down because of one single error, one big villain or one event. It was a combination of many factors both local and global, mistakes at crucial moments that failed to prevent dire consequences of what had been building for some years. (There was even a small Canadian hand in the form of TD Bank whose London office merrily sold to the carry trade wagonloads of highly profitable glacier bonds denominated in Icelandic currency but sold outside Iceland.) A good summary might be the quote he includes from a 2008 Merrill Lynch credit report on Iceland: " ... rapid expansion, inexperienced, yet aggressive management, high dependency on external funding, high gearing to equity markets, connected party opacity. In other words: too fast, too young, too much, too short, too connected, too volatile."
With a little more of the human drama, this book could be made into a Hollywood movie (except of course for the heroic ending). The scene of the hedge fund managers coming to Iceland and mocking the executive of the Icelandic Central Bank as they detected weakness in Iceland's position is ready-made. Jonsson does include bits and pieces of personalities and their effects, though I would have welcomed more since I suspect such elements did influence the course of events more than is apparent in the book.
For Canadians the value of this book is the lessons and warnings. In the final chapter, Jonsson notes that the cost of bank bailout packages may yet become sovereign debt crises. He says some countries are especially at risk: a) small countries with, b) large, internationally exposed banking sectors, c) currency that is not a global reserve currency, and d) limited fiscal capacity. Jonsson asks whether even Britain itself could be in danger according to these criteria. Canada's banks escaped most of the 2008 financial havoc by their heavy reliance on stable domestic deposits so that is reassuring, as is the government's generally strong fiscal capacity, though it has been diminished by stimulus spending. However, Canadian complacency would be serious mistake.
The author does an excellent job keeping the story flowing and the tone light for what could easily have become too technical and dry. The author's position as chief economist at Kaupthing, one of the failed banks, seems not to have interfered with the presentation of a fair and unbiased account (bank executives get their share of blame).
For the individual investor and citizen, perhaps the biggest lesson from this book, is that the economic and investment landscape is highly complex, making it hard to know where things are going. Drastic bad things can and do happen, even to the surprise of highly motivated, smart, not-evil, though self-interested people. If you don't prepare for the worst, it may happen, even if it isn't your doing, and you may suffer the consequences.
Now many people are leaving Iceland, though Jonsson says Icelanders refuse to see themselves as victims. The acceptance of the 12,000 euro per person debt to reimburse Icesave depositors in the UK and Holland is being resisted within Iceland. The story isn't finished and the echoes of the crash will continue for a while yet.
A combination of an education and a good story, I highly recommend this book. My rating: 5 out of 5 stars.
Thank you to McGraw Hill for supplying a copy of the book for review..
Labels:
book review,
bubbles
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