Wednesday, 2 September 2009

Why Jumping on the China, India, Russia Investing Bandwagon Might Not Work

Countries experiencing rapid economic growth like China, India and Russia should be a good place to get higher stock market returns than stolid slower-growing places like Europe, right? Oops, not so fast.

Apparently, it ain't so. There is no relationship between a country's high GDP growth and stock market returns, especially not in the long run and only weakly in the short run. In Economic Growth and Equity Returns from SSRN, professor Jay Ritter calculated that there was in fact a negative relationship between economic growth and stock returns in 16 major countries (including Canada and the USA) over the period 1900 to 2002 - this chart is taken from the paper.

Other people have found the same thing, focusing on the USA - Crestmont Research's It's Not the Economy has a decade by decade chart showing the unpredictable differences in the same or opposite directions. CXO Advisory in Update: GDP Growth and Stock Market Returns tried calculating leads and lags to see GDP predicted the US market or vice versa and found that didn't really explain much either. In Canada, CIBC's Economic Insights of August 25th has this scatter plot which again demonstrates the same point.

Ritter's explanation is that consumers and company managers get the benefit of GDP growth, not stockholders.

He also makes the dramatic statement that past stock returns are of no use in predicting future returns!

The main metric that does predict future returns according to Ritter is the smoothed earnings yield (taking a 10 year average of earnings to eliminate business cycle effects) i.e. Earnings / Price. "A low smoothed earnings yield does, however, predict low real stock price growth over the following ten years. In other words, P/E ratios revert towards the mean through price changes rather than earnings changes." The only caveats that could derail that relationship would be: if managers and employees take the profits due to shareholders (are shareholder rights well protected?) and; if some catastrophe like war, revolution, hyperinflation destroys the value of financial assets. Based on the numbers in 2004, Ritter said that real annual compounded stock returns would average 4.5% instead of the historical 7%. Crestmont's little blurb attached to their chart also says it's the P/E that matters.

Wish I had the data to do the calculation for today's markets. The Price part of the equation is down quite a bit, such that the E/P will be lower but is it enough to produce good future equity returns?

In any case, these studies suggest strongly that the assumption that China's rising economic success means assured investing success is wrong and likely to disappoint.

Monday, 31 August 2009

Book Review: Worry-Free Investing (UK edition) by Zvi Bodie and Ian Sykes


"... invest in inflation-linked government savings products"

That quote taken from the first page of the preface conveys the essential message of this book. The basic stance of the book is that essential "cannot afford to lose them" funds should be invested in inflation-linked products and if current savings are not sufficient to reach future goals that way, then one should either save at a higher rate, reduce goals or work longer, but not try to get a higher rate of return by investing in risky stocks.

I must admit to being surprised by the book. Despite the impeccable credentials of the authors (Bodie is a finance prof who co-authored the widely-used Investments textbook and Sykes is a consulting actuary in the UK) and the cover endorsements by a couple of Nobel prize winners, the good content is under-mined by poorly chosen assumptions for a number of examples.

Unrealistic Assumptions:
  • 2% real rate of return in Index-Linked Savings Certificates; the current rate is only 1% per National Savings and Investments; using Bodie and Sykes' own calculator from the downloadable spreadsheet on the book website, that would bump up the required savings rate by almost 5% of salary per year, a huge jump
  • 20 years in retirement; given rising life expectancy, one or the other of a couple is highly likely to survive beyond 20 years, especially if retiring before 65. Life expectancy is just an average - many people die older. If that happens what would one do if the planning has been to run out of money at 85 but one is still alive? Increasing the estimate of years in retirement to 25 by itself raises the requires savings rate by around 3%. Combined, the two factors would raise total annual savings to 24% of salary. To be really sure of being dead by the time money runs out, one might use 30 or 35 years in retirement. Is that realistic? The book's answer to life expectancy and the risk of outliving income from inflation-linked instruments is to buy an annuity. But buying an inflation-indexed annuity with the calculator's total estimate of future savings would, per the FSA website where current quotes can be obtained (it is commendable that the book provides the link), produce an annual income that would be far short - only about 61% - of the desired 70% income replacement.
  • 70% income replaced in retirement - on the other hand, the authors use without comment this oft-disputed piece of "retirement experts" advice; 70% is un-necessarily high in many cases, and significantly controllable by retirees. A lower retirement income can substantially reduce required savings rate - by about 4% using their base case numbers.
  • 10% annual rate of withdrawal from the initial amount of a retirement portfolio. The rule of thumb safe withdrawal rate in retirement is 4% for a mixed portfolio of stocks and bonds, so using an unrealistically high rate destroys the credibility of the book's contention, which is true, that the variability and the sequence of returns during the initial years of retirement make a critical difference in the long term survival of the portfolio. If a person were to withdraw 10% a year from a portfolio consisting only of inflation-indexed securities earning 1% a year, it wouldn't last long either.
  • introducing the idea that stocks are risky, even in the long run, in chapter 1 by showing the decline of stocks in a three year period - that's hardly the long run.
I also found it strange to see the authors showing how to construct a type of principle-protected note by combining bonds with call options. For a book seemingly targeted at the beginner level (later on they say if it is too complicated to pick up the phone to buy index-linked products, then you probably need a professional financial planner's assistance), the idea of buying options is likely far beyond what most people would feel capable of doing. Similarly the future value math formulas peppered through the chapters (and the companion website does not have the future value calculator as promised in the text) will surely seem daunting and complex to the beginner.

There is still a lot to like about this book and much useful advice:
  • defines risk tolerance in practical terms like the safer your projected future earnings, and the greater your ability and willingness to postpone retirement if risky investments perform badly, the higher your risk tolerance instead of emotions
  • stocks did not provide any inflation protection during the high inflation years of the 1970s
  • shows how to calculate value of future requirements and provides an online calculator at the book website
  • shows various methods (specific to the UK) for obtaining extra retirement income from one's home
  • recommending to people who do invest in stocks to do so via low cost index funds and suggests some circumstances when they feel it is appropriate for people to invest in stocks
  • presents a simple, sensible six step process to build a financial plan
  • tells how to find trustworthy professional advice and briefly debunks a number of myths that can lead astray
  • excellent collection of tools and useful links to websites e.g. FSA website for getting a current representative quote for an annuity from various providers, Government Actuary life expectancy tables
This book reminded me that Canada lacks one valuable savings product available in the UK - inflation-linked savings certificates which are completely free of tax. There is certainly a need for something that provides inflation protection and no default risk for a taxable account. As it is now with real return bonds in Canada, the government taxes everything on RRBs, including the inflation adjustment component of the return, which makes it quite unattractive to hold outside a registered account.

I cannot subscribe to the book's fundamental philosophy of taking no risk to achieve financial goals. I believe that investing in a diversified portfolio which includes equities can be a reasonable long term strategy to achieve long term returns that are substantially higher than the ultra-safe inflation-indexed products touted as the answer in this book. Between the ultra-safe strategy and the much riskier 100% stocks approach there is a middle ground. Sure if you don't need to, don't take the risk, but if you do, as most people do, then the restrictive alternatives proposed by Bodie and Sykes should not be the only path. You just need to be aware of the risk you are taking and be ready to do the back up plan of working longer. With the no-risk strategy, you are also sure that you will not have an upside either.

My rating: 3.5 out 5 stars.

Saturday, 29 August 2009

Financial Bad Effect of Obesity

Apparently, obesity is not just bad for your physical health, it hurts you financially as well. In Obesity and wages: using body composition as an alternative to BMI, Georgia State University Economics professor Erdal Tekin finds that "... increased levels of body fat decreases wages of both males and females." The converse is true as well: "... individuals with high levels of fat-free mass or lean body mass earn a wage premium".

Along the way, he notes that Body Mass Index (BMI) - the ratio of weight in kilograms and height in meters squared - is not a very good measure of being too fat due to differences in body build, fat patterning, and muscularity.

Friday, 28 August 2009

Secret of Canadian Bank Resilience Explained

It was reliance on you and me, that's what explains the strength of Canadian banks during the financial crisis, according to Rocco Huang and Lev Ratnovski in Why are Canadian banks more resilient? And what can we do about risky wholesale funding? posted at Vox. That's right, reliance on deposits instead of wholesale borrowing from other banks explains most of the difference in our banks' performance by insulating them from the freeze-up last fall of the inter-bank wholesale funding market. Maybe they could thank Canadians by lowering fees or raising interest on deposits? That would be fair wouldn't it? After all, if depositors provide the stable basis on which the Royal is able to make large trading profits, some quid pro quo is in order, no? Disclosure: Just on the off chance they do not follow through, I own some bank shares to get my share of the profits.

Thursday, 27 August 2009

Canadian ABCP Explained, Health Warning

Bond expert Edward Devlin of PIMCO explained how ABCP works in Changing on the Fly: Canadian Credit Markets. Warning: reading and trying to understand how it works will hurt your brain! Only an expert could understand it. I doubt even 0.1% of average investors could, or 1% of investors not specialized in fixed income, even when it is explained clearly as in this example. Did regulators or ratings agencies like DBRS even understand what was going on?

PIMCO certainly knew what was going on and took advantage, though it seems not in a direct way, merely through exploiting the indirect effects; "Needless to say, PIMCO has not invested in the ABCP of any Canadian conduits, but we have found a way to capitalize on their market impact."

Favorite quote from this article, written in May 2007, a few months before ABCP blew up: " ... tick, tick, tick ..."

Moral of the story: don't invest in something you don't understand. That's why people like Warren Buffett say the average investor should stick to index funds, despite the fact that he, an expert, doesn't operate that way.

Reality check: if you think you understand something, ask yourself if you really do. The ultimate test of perfect understanding: could you explain to someone how to create the product in question?

Wednesday, 26 August 2009

International Diversification for the Canadian Investor: partial evidence

There is much published material on how international diversification benefits US investors but surprisingly little on the topic from the perspective of a Canadian investor. While one would normally expect that results from one country will be repeated elsewhere, as with so much else in investing (e.g. mutual fund MERs are too high, bonds return less than stocks over the long run), it is always worthwhile to look specifically at the Canadian experience.

In 2007 two graduate students from Simon Fraser University, Lei (Jeff) Wang and Luoxin (Peter) Wang took a look at the period 1996-2006 in their thesis Can Canadian Investors Still Benefit from International Diversification: A Recent Empirical Test. They wanted to figure out how much benefit could be obtained from international diversification in recent years given the rise in world economic integration and the convergence of stock market returns, which we all observed last autumn as markets crashed together in perfect unison. They took account of currency shifts to estimate real returns for portfolios optimized using equities and/or bonds from the USA, UK, Japan and Hong Kong combined with Canadian stocks, bonds and T-bills/cash.

Their results are positive but less strong than I would have hoped or expected. Despite correlations that did not exceed about 0.7 amongst any of the asset classes and a number of negative correlations (especially bonds vs stocks), the benefits of both return enhancement or risk reduction (aka reduction of volatility / standard deviation) were quite modest. The main benefit came from the addition of international bonds, which provided a hedge against inflation for the Canadian investor. The optimized portfolios they came up with are decidedly unusual - most have a 0% weight in US equities and not a single one has any UK or Hong Kong equity component.

Part of the problem with the weak benefit they found is that, as they note, in this particular period of 1996-2006 the Canadian stock market outperformed everyone else's. That may not, probably will not, be the case forever, especially since the Canadian stock market is so concentrated in only three sectors - financial services, resources and energy. Thus, diversification should work better over a longer period in the future than their results show. A second point worth considering is that they found a fairly significant inflation-hedging benefit during a period when inflation in Canada has been consistently low. That also may not be true forever. It's good to have a supplement to real return bonds as an inflation hedge. The final point, which they do not discuss and which is probably significant, is that their portfolio construction method included no rebalancing. They calculated the single optimal portfolio for the duration. Rebalancing provides the "buy low-sell high" mechanism for enhancing portfolio returns and reducing risk. Perhaps they can do a PhD to do more calculations.

Economic Recovery after the Crisis - How Long? Lasting Effects?

Yesterday James Hymas of PrefBlog posted on the papers coming out of the recent Jackson Hole Symposium on Financial Stability and Macroeconomic Policy. One of the papers Hymas links to is Financial Crises and Economic Activity, written by Stephen G Cecchetti, Marion Kohler and Christian Upper.

They study the severity and duration of the numerous past banking and financial crises (no less than 124 between 1970 and 2007, out of which they pick 40 since 1980 to dissect). They estimate that the US and the UK will recover to pre-crisis levels of GDP by mid 2010. Japan will have had the shortest but the most severe recession. Canada is not mentioned. I guess that's because it did not have its own banking and financial crisis, it merely got sideswiped by that of the USA and the others.

They also conclude that there is no such thing as an average crisis and therefore trying to predict based on averages is useless. But they do identify a bunch of factors that influence severity of fall and speed of rebound to come up with their estimation, which is couched with the usual "results can vary a lot from the point number".

One interesting observation they make is that countries with sovereign debt crises who default have much shorter and less severe economic contractions. The money that need not be paid back to foreign lenders then gets used to fund domestic expansion. Hmmm, maybe the USA should stiff the Chinese who own so much of their government debt.

The bad news is that recovering to get to where GDP would have grown to had a crisis not occurred takes years, over 4 years on average. That's even when growth is faster after than before the crisis, as it often is. It's a version of the problem all too familiar to investors - a 50% decline needs a subsequent 100% increase merely to get back to the starting point. Worse, some countries have even suffered from on-going long term lower growth rates after the crisis ends, in other words they suffer lasting damage. Will that be the case this time with the USA or the UK?

For investors, possible longer term post-recovery effects - here the authors offer no opinion as to whether we are likely to face any of these negatives - include:
  • higher real interest rates as hugely increased government borrowing crowds out private borrowers, making capital investment costlier
  • rising actual and expected inflation
  • higher risk premia as both estimates of risk go up and willingness to take on risk goes down, which would lower returns of riskier things like stocks as safe haven assets are favoured

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